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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc.,
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Vb.

Court of Appeal Case No. 2005 0181 CA
1 CACHE, L.L.C., GARY R. BRACKEN,
and AARON BRACKEN,
District Court
Case No. 040101608

Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Section
78-2a-3(j). Plaintiff may take appeal from a final order of dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff s
Complaint. Utah Code Section 78-2-2. Plaintiff may take appeal from a final order granting
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal, if said Motion was treated as a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Utah Code Section 78-2-2.
Plaintiffs complaint was filed in the First District Court, alleging breach of contract, and
alleging that Defendant GARY BRACKEN and Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed an
individual personal guarantee, in which Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN
agreed to pay all amounts due and owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Plaintiffs complaint and
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint further alleged that as a result of 1 CACHE, L.L.C. default
on its open account agreement with Plaintiff, Defendant GARY BRACKEN and Defendant
AARON BRACKEN were liable for a principle balance of $126,345.07.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
POINT I:

Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's
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Order of January 25, 2005, denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter an Order
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, given that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and Plaintiff established that: (1) Plaintiff/Appellant delivered both invoices and
goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C.; (2) After subtracting all payments, the debt amount of $126,345.07
is owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C., pursuant to the invoices and goods delivered; and (3) Defendants
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee agreement, personally
guaranteeing payment of all sums owed by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. on the open account?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents

a question of law, which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal
Company v. Thavn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110
P.3d 168, 172 (Utah App. 2005). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has been a
showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King International Inc. 17 P.3
1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the district court's
decision to deny summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district court's legal
decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id

POINT II:

Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court Order

of January 25, 2005, granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, given that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON
BRACKEN entered into, and breached a personal guarantee contract entered between Defendants
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN, and Plaintiff DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has
2

been a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King International,
Inc. 17 P.3 1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district court's legal
decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id.

POINT III:

Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's

Order of January 25, 2005, which, in effect, denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to

amend, the appellate court will affirm the denial unless the trial court abused its discretion.
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah
1998).

DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The full tests of the following determinative statutes are reproduced at Appendix A.
A.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12.

B.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.

C.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a commercial collection case, governed by article II of the Uniform Commercial
Code. See Utah Code Section 70A-2-101 et seq. (District Court File, pgs. 2 - 49) DBL
DISTRIBUTING, Inc., sold electronic goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. on an open account. (District
Court File, pgs. 2 - 49) The goods were invoiced and delivered to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. GARY
BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee, which guaranteed that they
would each pay the open account debt if 1 CACHE, L.L.C. defaulted. (District Court File, pgs. 2
- 49) 1 CACHE, L.L.C. did not pay for the goods delivered and invoiced. (District Court File,
pgs. 2 - 49) 1 CACHE, L.L.C. filed bankrupcty and received a discharge of the debt. Plaintiff
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., filed suit against GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN to
obtain a judgment against them, individually, in the amount of $126,345.07. (District Court File,
pgs. 2 - 49)

B.

Course of the Proceeding.

On August 4, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant GARY BRACKEN
alleging that Defendant GARY BRACKEN was liable for a principle balance of $126,345.07 in
unpaid, outstanding invoices, which he personally guaranteed. (District Court File, pgs. 2 - 49)
On August 26, 2004, Defendant GARY BRACKEN filed a Motion to Dismiss and
Request for Sanctions and a Verified Memorandum of Points and Authorities is support of the
Motion to Dismiss. (District Court File, pgs. 50 - 52) In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant
GARY BRACKEN asserted 1 CACHE, L.L.C. was a Utah Corporation which totally shield
GARY R. BRACKEN from personal liability through the corporate shield. Further that, if
GARY BRACKEN ever signed anything, it was only in his representative capacity as the
4

President of 1 CACHE, L.L.C., and he never personally guaranteed anything.

(District Court

File, pgs. 50-52)
On August 30, 2004, Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and
Request for Sanctions and Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.
(District Court File, pgs. 64 - 77). The Opposition attached the personal guarantees signed by
GARY BRACKEN, as Exhibit B and C.

(District Court File, pgs. 74 - 77). Plaintiffs Motion

for Leave to File an Amended Complaint sought to drop 1 CACHE, L.L.C. as a party, and add
AARON BRACKEN as a party, and was otherwise the same as the Complaint file on August 4th.
On September 8, 2004, Defendant GARY BRACKEN filed the Affidavit of Gary R.
Bracken, Defendant's Verified Reply Objection to Motion to Amend Complaint, and Request for
Hearing. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 102). In his affidavit, (File pgs. 82-88) Defendant
GARY BRACKEN admitted that he signed the Credit Application which was attached to this
Affidavit as Exhibit 1. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 89, see pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, Exhibit
1). The Exhibit 1 AGREEMENT, (pg. 86), provides in the last two sentences: "The
undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this
Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a
continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." (District
Court File, pgs. 86, 97, 121)
On September 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment and
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

(District Court File, pgs.

103 -168).
On September 30, 2004, Defendant GARY BRACKEN filed his Response Supporting
Motion to Dismiss and Request for Sanctions, (District Court File, pgs. 169 - 172), his Verified
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, (District Court File, pgs. 173-181), Affidavit of Gary
5

Bracken (District Court File, pgs. 182 - 189), and Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment, (District Court File, pgs. 190-191).
On October 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed Notices to Submit Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint, for Decision. (District Court
File, pgs. 192 - 195).
13, 2004.

C.

On October 14, 2005, the Court set the matter for hearing on December

(District Court File, pgs. 196-197)

Course of Proceedings after the December 13, 2004 hearing.

The Court heard argument from the parties on December 13, 2004 for about a half an
hour, and took the matter under advisement. (District Court File, pg. 198, Hearing Transcript,
2:1-21:15)
On January 7, 2005, the Court filed its decision, entitled Memorandum of Decision.
(District Court File, pgs. 199 - 202). Then, January 25, 2005, the Court entered an Order which
denied Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and granted Defendant's Motion to dismiss the
case against 1 CACHE, LLC, GARY R. BRACKEN, and AARON BRACKEN.

(District Court

File, pgs. 203 - 205).
On February 17, 2005, Plaintiff/Appellant filed the Notice of Appeal, appealing the final
ORDER entered on January 25, 2005. (District Court File, pgs. 210 - 211)

SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT FACTS

As Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment established, 1
CACHE, L. C , entered an open account agreement with Plaintiff DBL DISTRIBUTING where 1
CACHE, L. C. was able to purchase consumer electronic accessories, wholesale from DBL
DISTRIBUTING.

Plaintiff invoiced 1 CACHE, L.L.C., for the products ordered by 1 CACHE,
6

LX.C. and 1 CACHE, L.L.C., received delivery of the goods described on the invoices.
Defendant 1 CACHE, L.L.C. was required to pay for the invoiced goods within thirty (30) days
of the date that the goods were delivered and invoiced. (District Court File, pgs.l 15 - 168, see
pg. 116,parag. 1,2)
The Affidavit further established that, at the time the account was established, Defendant
GARY R. BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee, which was attached as Exhibit A to the
Plaintiffs Affidavit.

(District Court File, pgs.l 15 - 168, see pg. 116, parag. 2 and pg. 121)

The Affidavit of Gary Bracken established that the CREDIT APPLICATION
AGREEMENT was signed by GARY BRACKEN on or about "01/26/99". (District Court File,
pgs. 82 - 89, see pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, Exhibit 1). The language above Mr. GARY
BRACKEN'S signature reads, "The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of
all sums owed pursuant to this Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is
intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to
creditor." (See District Court File, pgs. 86, 97, 116 parag. 3, pg. 121, Hearing Transcript 8:19 9:23)
Then, on April 24, 2001, Defendant GARY R. BRACKEN signed an additional agreement
called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT" which states:
"The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to
this Agreement and further Agree to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and
is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to the
creditor."

(See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, pgs. 87-88, 99, pg. 116 parag. 3,

pg. 123)

On the line for the signature, which starts "by:
BRACKEN signed his name. In the next line over, on the line
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", GARY

"TITLE:

", GARY BRACKEN, in his own handwriting wrote,

"PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity". (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7,
pgs. 87-88, 99, 123) Defendant GARY BRACKEN argued at the December 13th hearing that by
marking the TITLE line with the words, "PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity", that
designation negated the above-stated language of the contract which provided for the "personal
guarantee" of payment. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 89, Hearing Transcript, 15:17-17:19)
At the December 13th hearing, Plaintiff argued that two contracts were entered into: One
contract between DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., and 1 CACHE, L.L.C., in which GARY
BRACKEN signed as President for 1 CACHE, L.L.C., and a second contract between the
undersigned personal guarantor, GARY BRACKEN, and DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. (Hearing
Transcript, 6:6 - 12:2) Plaintiff further argued that second personal guarantee contract was not
negated by Defendant GARY BRACKEN writing in the language on the TITLE line of the
contract which stated, "PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity". (Hearing Transcript,
6:6 - 12:2)
The Plaintiffs Affidavit also established that Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed the
same personal guarantee on July 18, 200L (District Court File, pgs. 116 parag. 4, pg. 125) No
additional language was added after his signature. But, on the TITLE line, Mr. AARON
BRACKEN designated his office with 1 CACHE, L.L.C as being, Vice President. (District
Court File, pgs. 116 parag. 4, pg. 125)
At the hearing held on December 13, 2004, on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary, Plaintiffs requested that the Court enter judgment against the
Defendants AARON BRACKEN and GARY R. BRACKEN for the principle sum of
$126,345.07, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $31,586.26, plus interest of 10 % per year
starting from September 13, 2001, plus court costs incurred. (Hearing Transcript, 4:13 - 25)
Defendants did not dispute the amounts requests, and the only defense put forward was
8

that no personal guarantee contract was entered between Defendants AARON BRACKEN and
GARY BRACKEN, and Plaintiff DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. (District Court File, pgs. 82 - 89,
Hearing Transcript, 15:17- 18:22)
THEREFORE, since a personal guarantee contract was entered into between the parties,
the Court should summarily direct the District Court to enter judgment against Defendant GARY
BRACKEN as requested by the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

On or about January 26, 1999, Defendant GARY BRACKEN, the President of 1 CACHE,
L.L.C., signed the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT which created an open account,
where 1 CACHE, L.L.C. purchased electronic goods from DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc. The
language directly above Mr. GARY BRACKEN'S signature stated that:

"The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant
to this Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be
and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to
creditor."

Subsequently, DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., received goods from DBL DISTRIBUTING,
Inc. After all payments are subtracted, 1 CACHE, L.L.C, owes DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., the
amount of $126,345.07 resulting from the delivery of goods by DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., to 1
CACHE, L.L.C. on the aforementioned open account.
1 CACHE, L.L.C. filed chapter 7 Bankruptcy and discharged its obligation. Thus, DBL
DISTRIBUTING, Inc., filed an action in district court to collect the balance owing against GARY
BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN, the personal guarantors of 1 CACHE, L.L.C.'s obligation
9

to DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., on the open account. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment supported by an affidavit of the Plaintiff which established all of the necessary facts
required for entry of judgment against GARY BRACKEN. Instead, the Court granted Defendant
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN'S motion to dismiss, on the basis that Defendants
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN did not personally guarantee the debt owing on the
open account.
This district court decision turned on the interpretation of the contractual language.
However, the district court was wrong as a matter of law. Looking at the phrase:
"The undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant
to this Agreement"...
There is only one possible meaning to give to this phrase. That meaning makes GARY
BRACKEN, who is the undersigned, personally liable for the charges placed on the open account,
i.e. the unpaid invoices. Thus, this court should reverse the decision of the district court, and
remand with instructions that the district court is to deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's

Order of January 25, 2005, denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter an Order
granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, given that there were no genuine issues of
material fact and Plaintiff established that: (1) Plaintiff/Appellant delivered both invoices and
goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C.; (2) After subtracting all payments, the debt amount of $126,345.07
is owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C., pursuant to the invoices and goods delivered; and (3) Defendants
GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN signed a personal guarantee agreement, personally
10

guaranteeing payment of all sums owed by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. on the open account?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents

a question of law, which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal
Company v. Thavn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is
ambiguous is decided by the court as a matter of law. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110
P.3d 168, 172 (Utah App. 2005). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has been a
showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King International, Inc. 17 P.3
1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the district court's
decision to deny summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district court's legal
decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." IdL

A.

The undisputed facts.

Plaintiff established that 1 CACHE, L.L.C, received invoices from Plaintiff, for products
ordered by 1 CACHE, L.L.C, and delivered to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Plaintiff further established
that the total outstanding amount owed from goods ordered by and delivered to, 1 CACHE,
L.L.C, was $126,345.07, owing since September 13, 2001. (District Court File, pgs. 117, parag.
6)
Plaintiff established that on or about 01/26/99, GARY BRACKEN signed a CREDIT
APPLICATION AGREEMENT which, above the signature line, had the language, "The
undersigned agrees to unconditionally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to this
Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a
continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." (See District
Court File, pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 2, pg. 121, Hearing
11

Transcript 8:19-9:23)

B.

Personal Guarantee creating a contract between DBL Distributing, Inc., and
Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken.

The key question in this case is: What is the meaning of the language of the CREDIT
APPLICATION AGREEMENT? To interpret the full meaning of the CREDIT APPLICATION
AGREEMENT, Defendant has put forward the Affidavit of Gary Bracken with extrinsic evidence
about what he really intended when he sign the two different CREDIT APPLICATION
AGREEMENTS. Defendant GARY BRACKEN argued before the district court that the
CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT was a credit application for 1 CACHE, L.L.C., not for
Gary Bracken himself. (Hearing Transcript, 15:17- 22)
Although the district court may have relied on this extrinsic evidence, it is appellant's
position that such evidence must be considered only in the proper context and in accordance with
well-settled principles of contract interpretation. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110 P.3d
168, 172 (Utah App. 2005).
Plaintiff/Appellant argued before the district court that GARY BRACKEN'S signature
created a second agreement between DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., and GARY BRACKEN which
is a personal guarantee by the undersigned. (Hearing Transcript, 11:17- 25, 14:25 -15:6).
When the parties to a contract disagree about the meaning of a provision, principles of
contract interpretation require the Court to give effect to the meaning intended by the parties at
the time they entered into the agreement. Central Florida Investment, Inc. v. Parkwest
Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah App. 2002). A court may rely on extrinsic evidence only
after it has determined that the provision is ambiguous. Neilsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P.3d 600, 602
(Utah 2003). Otherwise, when the agreement is unambiguous, the court must "determine the
parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law.
12

Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 2004).
It was and is Plaintiff/Appellant's position that the agreement is unambiguous. (Hearing
Transcript, 6:12 - 7:4, 11:17 - 25, 14:3 - 15:6).
When interpreting a contract, a court is to consider each provision in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Green River Canal Co. v.
Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003).
In utilizing the above-stated approach, the language above GARY BRACKEN'S
signature, which reads, "The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums
owed pursuant to this Agreement", means that GARY BRACKEN is personally liable for the
charges placed on the open account, i.e. the unpaid invoices. No other meaning is allowed to be
given by some extrinsic evidence. No other meaning gives effect to all the provisions of the
contract, ignoring none.

1).

The first signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, signed on
January 26,1999,

The first signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, signed on January 26, 1999,
consisted of two pages, and had the signature of Gary Bracken without any additional language.
Defendant argued that Gary Bracken signed the agreement, only in his representative capacity,
but, there is no language next to the signature to support this argument. Essentially, Defendant
relies on the fact that the entity applying for credit is "1 CACHE". (See District Court File, pg.
83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 2, pg. 121, Hearing Transcript 8:19 9:23)
With regard to the first agreement, which is the controlling agreement because it was
signed prior to the date any of the invoiced products were delivered, there is clearly no ambiguity
and the Court is restricted to reading the language of the contract. Thus, the district court erred
13

in not granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and holding that GARY BRACKEN
was personally liable for the unpaid invoices.

2).

The second signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, signed
on April 24. 2001.

Plaintiff established that on April 24, 2001, Defendant GARY R. BRACKEN signed an
additional agreement called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT" which states:

"The undersigned agrees to personally guarantee payment of all sums owed pursuant to
this Agreement and further agrees to its terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and
is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written notice to the
creditor." ( See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, pgs. 88, District Court File, pg. 116,
parag. 3,pg. 123)

The new credit application signed by Gary Bracken on April 24, 2001, was to replace the
old one signed on January 26, 1999. According to Mr. GARY BRACKEN'S understanding,
DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., in April, 2001, DBL Distributing was requiring GARY BRACKEN
to sign the personal guarantee.

(Hearing Transcript, 16:16 - 25).

On the line for the signature, which starts "by:

", GARY

BRACKEN signed his name. In the next line over, on the line which says:
"TITLE:

", GARY BRACKEN, in his own handwriting wrote,

"PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity". Defendant GARY BRACKEN argued at the
December 13th hearing that by marking the TITLE line with the words, "PRESIDENT, only in his
representative capacity", negated the language making the agreement a "personal guarantee" of
payment. (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 7, pgs. 88, District Court File, pg. 116, parag.
14

3,pg. 123)
The principle question with regard to the April 24th contract is as follows: Does Mr
BRACKEN negate the personal guarantee with the language, with "PRESIDENT, only in his
representative capacity"?
The first question for the court to determine is whether or not the adding of the language,
"PRESIDENT, only in his representative capacity", creates an ambiguity. See Neilsen v. Gold's
Gym, 78 I ", 3d 600, 602 (I Jtal t 2003); t md Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing
Partners, Inc., 94 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 2004). If the agreement is unambiguous, the court must
"determine the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter
of law." In any even, the court is to consider each pi o v ision it I r i latioi I to all of tl le otliers, w itl: i a
view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d
11

Jtah 2003).
It is Plaintiff/Appellant's positioi t that there is i 10 ai i ibigi lit) , and the contract car l be i ead,

consistently, giving effect to all the language in the contract. The Court should look first within
the foi I corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties, and should attempt to
harmonize the provisions in the agreement. Central Florida Investment, Inc. v. Parkwest
Associates, 40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah App. 2002).
In taking this approach, the reasonable interpretation of the language establishes that the
contract is, really, two agreements. The first agreement is an open account agreement, created
between DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., and 1 CACHE, L.L.C. For the first agreement, the open
accoiinf agreement, someone with the appropriate authority to enter contracts on behalf of the
limited liability company must sign the contract. I In is, the c .onti i ic t reqi tires tl : , ; it the signing
person state his/her "TITLE". A statement that the signing person has authority to represent 1
(' • \ < ' 111 I 1 i" is n' 11111 < c • \ I I o 11 >rm the first contract.
A second contract is formed between DBL DIS' I R IBI J I ING, Inc., and the ' "undersigned"

who personally guarantees payment of charges placed on the open account. For this second
contract, the "undersigned" line is controlling, and the "TITLE" line is not relevant to the
guarantee contract. The TITLE line, only applies to the open account agreement, by the very
terms of the personal guarantee contract language.
Furthermore, the plain language of the second contract, the personal guarantee states,
"This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and shall not be revoked except by written
notice to the creditor." Mr. BRACKEN, clearly, could have provided a definite and unambiguous
cancellation of the personal guarantee. The plain language of the agreement gives him that
power. But, Mr. BRACKEN did not provide that written notice canceling the personal
guarantee, because Mr. BRACKEN was aware that the flow of goods to 1 CACHE, L.L.C.,
would have immediately ceased, and he did not want to jeopardize his supply line.

3).

The third signed CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, was
signed by AARON BRACKEN on July 18, 2001.

On or about July 18, 2001, Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed the same agreement
called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMEN", which Gary Bracken had previously signed.
(See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 8, pgs. 89, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 3, pg. 125)
Next to the line which reads, "TITLE", AARON BRACKEN wrote, "Vice President". Next to
the line which reads, "FIRM NAME", AARON BRACKEN wrote, "1 CACHE". (See District
Court File, pg. 83, parag. 8, pgs. 89, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 3, pg. 125)
There is only one meaning to be given to this document and this intention to enter a
contract. The contract has the effect of making AARON BRACKEN personally liable for the
charges placed on the open account, i.e. the unpaid invoices, after the date he signed the
agreement. No other meaning is allowed to be given by some extrinsic evidence. No other
meaning gives effect to all the provisions of the contract, ignoring none.
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POINT II:

Whether the Utah i ourl ol Appeal should n \crsc Hie i "Ir.iiilticl < "our! < >i<ln

of January 25, 2005, granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, given that: (1) Plaintiff did plead a
cause of action; (2) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants GARY
BR ACKEN and AARON BRACKEN entered into and breached a personal guarantee eonftuii?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents

a question of law, which the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal
Company v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). Summary Judgment is appropriate only if
thoiv ins been a showing "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." J.R. Simplot Company v. Sales King
International Inc. 17 P.3 1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews
t!le distilet coiiiIs decision to grant summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the district
court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts and mieicih:^
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." I d

A.

Standard for Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss, made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) admits the facts alleged in the
c 11111111 i 111 h 111 challenges the plaintiff s right to relief based on those facts. Russell v. Standard
Corporation, 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). The affidavits or other evidence is presented in
conjunction with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the court does not exclude them,
the motion is generally treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah
R. of Civ. Proc. DIPT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co. 926 P.2d 835, 839 (I Jtahl996).
Because disposition of a case by summary judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the
merits, an> • i :)i it t concei iiing questions of fact, including t vidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. Beehive
1 ;

Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989).

Summary judgment is never

used to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of
fact in dispute. Hill ex. rel. Fogle v. Grand Cent.. Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (1970). A genuine issue of
material fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on
whether the party opposing the motion, that opposing party's conduct measures up to the
required standard. Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982).

B#

Facts in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that 1 CACHE, L. C , entered an
open account agreement. The open account agreement is memorialized on the documents
attached to the Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibits A, B
and C. (See District Court File, pgs. 115 - 125).
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that Defendant GARY R.
BRACKEN signed the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, consisted
of two pages, and had the signature of Gary Bracken without any additional language. (See See
District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 5, pgs. 85-86, District Court File, pg. 116, parag. 1,2, pg. 120121, Hearing Transcript 8:19 - 9:23)
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that AARON BRACKEN signed
the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT attached to the Plaintiffs Affidavit as Exhibit C.
The CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT is the personal guarantee of AARON BRACKEN
for products ordered, pursuant to the open account agreement, delivered, and invoiced to 1
CACHE, L.L.C. (See District Court File, pg. 83, parag. 8, pgs. 89, District Court File, pg. 116,
parag. 3, pg. 125)
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that 1 CACHE, L.L.C. received
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from Plaintiff, products ordered I >> 1 CACI IE, I .1 . C , ai id < ieli\ c it sd t< 1 C : \Cl IE, I I .C
Plaintiff further established that 1 CACHE, L.I .C. was invoiced for those goods, and there
remained outstanding a total unpaid balance owing of $126,345.07, owing since September, 200L
(District Coi irt File, pg 115 168)
Before the district court, Plaintiff/Appellant established that Plaintiff is and was entitled to
judgment against the personal guarantors GARY R. BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN in the
amount of $ 126,345.0 / plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. (Disti i ::t Cour t File, pg.
115- 168,parag. 7, 8, 9, and 10)
But the district court dismissed the case. If the district court properly considered the
above-described evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, and properly
resolved those inferences in favor of DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., who opposed Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, the district court should not have granted Defendant GARY BRACKEN'S
Motion to Dismiss.

C

Law applied in considering Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The order granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was erroneous, and this Court should
reverse that < \-.:

oi Dismissal, enter an order directing the district court to deny the Motion to

dismiss and require that the district court requires Defendants GAR Y BRACKEN and AARON
BRACKEN to file answers.
Plaintiffs affidavit in support of Motion for Summary Judgment establishes a prima facie
case against Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN, which entitles Plaintiff to
recovery. (District Court File, pg. 1 !.:= 168).

In this case, the invoices which are summarized on Exhibit D, (File 126 - 168) attached to
I

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, (File 115 to 118), and Exhibit
D, constitute the agreement between the parties. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-201, 202, and
207.

Utah Code Section 70A-2-201(2) states:

"Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know
its contents, it satisfies the requirement of Subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of object to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.

In this case, 1 CACHE, L.L.C., ordered electronic goods, received the electronic goods,
and was invoiced for those electronic goods. There is no evidence in the record that 1 CACHE,
L.L.C. ever disputed any of the invoices received. Thus, the price and quantity listed on each
summarized invoice is the amount due and owing by 1 CACHE, L.L.C.
Further, 1 CACHE, L.L.C. received the goods and kept the electronic goods which were
provided to 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Thus, by the conduct of 1 CACHE, L.L.C, an agreement to pay
for the goods received was established. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-204 and 607.
Also, there is no dispute that the balance of $126,345.07, was never paid by 1 CACHE,
L.L.C. and that the balance of $126,345.07 is the amount of the outstanding unpaid balance
owing to DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., as a result of the invoices summarized on Exhibit D, (File
126 -168).
The only issue contested by Defendants GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN is
whether or not they are personally liable for the unpaid invoices of product delivered to 1
CACHE, L.L.C.
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D.

Personal Guarantee creating a contract between DBL Distributing, Inc., and
Gary Bracken and Aaron Bracken.

For the purpose of review on the issue of whether the Court inappropriately granted
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court should ignore the evidence which supports Defendants
argument. that Defer idants did i lot pei sonall) gi larantee pa> n lents of the open a xoi int, and only
look at the evidence which establishes or tends to establish that Defendants GARY BRACKEN
and AARON BRACKEN personally guaranteed payment of the goods received by 1 CACHE,
L.L.C • fr< >mDBI DIS I R IBI J I IN* 3, Ii M • Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.,
827 (Utah App. 1989).
Under Utah law, an enforceable contract requires a demonstrated mutual assent by the
paria

. mi!e^!:Mi .

I b> the tern is \

e agreement. Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v.

Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
In this case, GARY BRACKEN signed the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on
January 2:6, 1999 I he C R EDI I - \ I I ""I IC \ I ION \ GR EEN IEN I c < >nsiste< h >f 1 • • •« > pages w liich
are attached to the Affidavit of Gary Bracken, Exhibit 1. (See District Court File, pgs. 83, 85-86,
and. District Court File, pgs. 115-168, Hearing Transcript 8:19 - 9:23).
Construing all inferences in favor of I 'laintiff, tl le district court, shoi ii i 1 i, ; ;v e concluded that
by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, GARY
BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the personal guarantee agreement, which is stated in
the language immediate lb abo > ' e I"" Ii G \ R "i: BR ACKEN'S signature. As a result, the district
court should have denied Defendants Motion to Dismiss.

On or about Jul v IS, JIM! I, Defendant AARON BRACKEN signed the same agreement
called the "CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT", which Gary Bracken had previously
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signed. (See District Court File, pgs. 83-84, 89 and District Court File, pgs. 115-168.)
Construing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the district court should have concluded that
by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, GARY
BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the personal guarantee agreement, which is stated in
the language immediately above Mr. GARY BRACKEN'S signature. As a result, the district
court should have denied Defendants Motion to Dismiss.

POINT III:

Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's

Order of January 25, 2005, which, in effect, denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to

amend, the appellate court will affirm the denial unless the trial court abused its discretion.
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah
1998).

In this case, Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint was set for
hearing on December 13, 2005. (District Court File, pg. 196-197) The Court heard some
argument from counsel concerning the Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint.
(Hearing Transcript, 20:6 -21:14)

The district court did not, specifically, rule on Plaintiff

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint but entered an order which stated:
"Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case against 1 Cache, LLC, Gary R. Bracken and Aaron
Bracken is granted."
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to amend. It provides
that once a party files a responsive pleading, the other "party may amend his pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when
22

justice so requires." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d
1273, 1281 (Utah \99S)(quoting Rule 15 of the Utah R. of Civ. Proc). In reviewing a trial
coi ir t's • ieiiial of a i i ic Ii : i i to ai nend, the appellate • :oi n I: vv ill affirm the denial unless the trial court
abused its discretion. Id.
The discretion of a trial judge is not unlimited. I d Outright refusal to grant the leave
v • ithoi it am - ji istify ing i eason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion, it is merely
abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the [Utah Rule] . . sic .. Id.
In this case, the district court did not give any reason for its refusal to grant Plaintiffs
I\ lotion for I -e a^ > e to I ; ile First \ i nei I :! :::d Complaint, othei

••

as granting Defendant's -

Motion to Dismiss as to AARON BRACKEN. The district court's grant of the Motion to
Dismiss is not a sufficient reason to deny the Motion for Leave to Amend.
Thus, I Ins 1

'MIIII

'Jh.nl-ii truTM tin1 ilisliit (

l

-<*io

:--

r,<\ Defendants Motion to

Dismiss with regard to AARON BRACKEN and should remand the case to the district court,
with instructions that Plaintiff may proceed to file the First Amended Complaint, and pursue the
action! igainst \ \ R 01 1 BR A CKET J

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
First. ' his l\ »;| K sllatt ;C n u J; i 1,1, ill: J I ii h, it I he CR EDI I - \ I 'PI IC A I IOI I AGREEMENT,
signed by GARY BRACKEN on January 26, 1999, is unambiguous. The plain meaning of the
contract has the effect of making Defendant GARY BRACKEN personally liable for the unpaid
invoices < i/i it • • -n ti ic < )j n :n a« ;coi int en sated I ] til : CR EDI I APPLICA I ION AGREEMENT.
Second, this Appellate Court should hold that the CREDIT APPLICATION
AGREEMENT, signed by GARY BRACKEN on April 24, 2001, is unambiguous. The plain
meaning of the conti act has the effect of making Defendant GA R V BR ACKET J personally liable
for the unpaid invoices due on the open account.
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Third, this Appellate Court should hold that the CREDIT APPLICATION
AGREEMENT, signed by AARON BRACKEN on July 18, 2001 is unambiguous. The plain
meaning of the contract has the effect of making Defendant AARON BRACKEN personally liable
for the unpaid invoices due on the open account.
Fourth, this Appellate Court should hold that, construing all inferences in favor of
Plaintiff, the district court should have concluded that by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION
AGREEMENT, on January 26, 1999, GARY BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the
personal guarantee agreement, which is stated in the language immediately above Mr. GARY
BRACKEN'S signature. Further, construing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the district court
should have concluded that by signing the CREDIT APPLICATION AGREEMENT, on July 18,
2001, AARON BRACKEN manifested an intention to enter the personal guarantee agreement,
which is stated in the language immediately above Mr. AARON BRACKEN'S signature. Thus,
this Court should reverse the district court's decision to grant Defendants Motion to Dismiss with
regard to both GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN and should remand the case to the
district court, with instructions that Plaintiff may proceed to file the First Amended Complaint,
and pursue the action against both GARY BRACKEN and AARON BRACKEN.
Fifth, this Appellate Court should hold that, as a matter of law, GARY BRACKEN is
liable for the outstanding invoices which were not paid by 1 CACHE, L.L.C. Thus, this Court
should reverse the district court decision to deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
this Court should remand the case to the district court, with instructions that the district court
should grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff Appellant DBL DISTRIBUTING, Inc., against GARY BRACKEN for the sum of
$126,345.07, plus attorney's fees as requested in Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, plus
interest at the rate of 10 % per year, pursuant to Utah Code Section 15-1-1, starting from
September 13, 2001, plus court costs incurred.
24

1 Plaintiff/Appellant its costs and attorney's fees
incurred for this appeal.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues raised are significant.

Dated, this if

day ot Scptembei, 2005.

Gregory M. Constantino

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was, this / /

day of September, 2005, mailed first

class, postage-prepaid to:
Marlin J. Grant
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
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ADDENDUM
Ml-M< WANINIM I >F DIVISION

ORDER
Utah Code § 78-2a-3.
Utah Code § 78-2-2.
Utah Code Section 70A-2-101.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-202.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-607.
tali t ode Ann. § 15-1-1.
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A

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

DBL DISTRIBUTING, INC, a Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v,
1 CACHE, LX.C, a Utah Limited Liability
Company, and GARY R, BRACKEN, an
individual,
Defendants,

*
*
*
*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*
*
+
*
+

Case No: 040101608 MI

This matter is before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
Plainiiffaiul a Motion to Diinniss filed by the D
issue relative to I CACHE, L.L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, which has been
discharged in bankruptcy. The Motion to Dismiss asks not only the action be dismissed against 1
CACHE, LX.C, because ofthebaakniptcy stay, but also
defending this action since the automatic stay should have prevented the action being filed
against said entity.
The balance of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant is based upon the language
ofthe documents attached tottiepleadings described as cre^
two which are germane to this action; one, prepared in April, 2001, and a previous like document
prepared in January, 1999. The operative language in those documentsreflectthe application for
credit is being made by 1 CACHE LX.C and no other persons. In the 1999 document, the
language which is salient to this motion is that *The undereigned agrees to unconditionally
guarantee payment of all sum* owed pursuant to ft is Agreemem and further agrees to its term$
regarding venue. This is intended ^

j

m

v?

except by written notice to creditor.*'
In the 2001 credit application, the language has been changed to read 'The undrsigned
agrees to personalty gam&tet payment of all sums awed pursuant to this Agreement and further
agrees to the terms regarding venue. This is intended to be and is a continuing guarantee and
shall not be revoked except by written notice to creditor." The major change is the wend
"personally" guarantee. Again in the 2001 application, the entity seeking credit in the application
is 1 CACHE, L.L.C.. with Gary Bracken, Aaron Bracken and Richard Bracken named as
proprietors, partners or officers. It should be noted first the that applications arc documents of the
Plaintiff, created by the Plaintiff and filled out apparently by the Defendants or at least signed by
the Defendants.
The curious tiring about the language is tot there is no distinction in the langiag^
between customer information, credit application and personal guarantee. In other words, the
personal guarantee, at least in the 2001 document, does not reflect a personal guarantee of
someone else's obligation. It appears to be a personal obligation by 1 CACHE L.L.C. of the
credit extended to it which is a result of the agreement, There is no signature line for the parties
except that at the bottom of the page and not inside the ''guarantee box/' The focus language is
part of the languagefoundwithin a box referencing the parties to the agreement, evidenced by
the beginning language "... we herein make application to DBL Distributing, Inc.,.." There is
not separate language from that above quoted referencing other parties such as third party
guarentees.
The Plaintiff would have the Court hold that the guarantee m the 1999 as well as the 2001
documents exposed the signer thereof to guarantee the payment of any credit extended as a result
of the agreement. But as to the 1999 document these is no question thatttiecustomer there w«g 1
CACHE LX.C ^ and it was not the Defendant Gary Bracken or any other individual. There is
little question from reading the document that the signature thereon was on behalf of 1 CACHJE
L.L,C, and there is no personal guarantee* only guaranteed by the customer
With respect to the 2001 document, two of which exists, one dated 3/22/2001 and one:
dated 4/24/2001, the former unsigned by an individual and the latterbdng signed by Defodaiit

x°°

Gary Bracken but as president in a representative capacity. Again the credit application is by
CACHE U L G The personal guarantee language there, it couid be argued that it is more
operative against a signatory in addition to the customer, but in this case there is an exception*
made by the signer as president in hisrepresentativeeapadty. The s e e ^
document signed by one Aaron Bracken, vice-president- The Plaintiff cites no law in its favor
relative to the construction of these two documents but the Court notes the law cited by the
Defendant as well as generally accepted construction principles would consider that the
documents wore created by the Plaintiff, the language thereof is the Plaintiffs language, the
customer is 1 CACHE L.L.C., there is no provision for liability on behalf of anyone else and the
signatories were in their representative capacities on bdialf of 1 CACHE LL.C.whick
guaranteed payment.
The Court is satisfied that the language within the four corners of the contract, (excluding
parole evidence as there is not an ambiguity created and if there was, it was created by die
Plaintiff] should be construed against Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
With respect to the claim by the Defendants of costs and attorney's fees incurred on
behalf of the discharged debtor, if such a claintexists, they must be brought by either the
bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate or the Court must be shown in feet that
right on obligation to defend that action is in the Defemteits, Othawised^rewasnoobUgatito
to defend that action since there is already a banlruptcy aiui therefore no a^
and costs will be granted. Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a formal order in
conformance herewith. +
Dated this ?

day of^I

^

BY THE COURT

&t

B

Mariinl Grant (#4581)
OLSON &HOGGAN,P.C
[Attorneys for Defendants
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
JLogan, Utah 84321
[Telephone: (435)752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, WAND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
BDBL DISTRIBUTING, INC. a
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
|vs.

ORDER

jl CACHE, L.L.C., a Utah Limited
Liability Company, and GARY R.
BRACKEN, an individual, and AARON
(BRACKEN, an individual

Civil No. 040101608 MI

Defendants.
This matter came before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the
[Plaintiffand a Motion to Dismissfiledby the Defendants. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
bought to enforce the credit applications. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss argued that there was no
personal liability for the individual's in the company and the individuals signed in there
[representative capacity, thus avoiding any personal liability. Defendants also argued that 1 Cache,
BLLC hadfiledbankruptcy and was not a proper party to this action. The Court having reviewed die
OLSON ft HOOGAN. P C
SB Wesr CKMTCM

(pleadings and briefs filed by both counsels now orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the case against 1 Cache, LLC, Gary JL Bracken and

* . o . fto* B2S
LOGAN. UTAH *4a2*O02B
(43&}7B2*1SS1

(Aaron Bracken is granted.
TOEMONTON OFFICE.
IZ3CMTNMM

P.O. aox 1 t f l

3.

Defendants' have sought attorney fees necessitated to argue and defend 1 Cache, LLC

TRCMONTON, MTAM 84937
teas* asr-aoBB

303

against the violation of the bankruptcy stay. If such a claim exists, the Court orders the Defendant
no seek those costs through the bankruptcy trustee on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. There may
pave been no obligation to defend 1 Cache, LLC inasmuch as there had already been a bankruptcy.
[Therefore, no attorney fees or costs will be awarded at least in this Court.
4.

This Order is based on a Memorandum Decision issued by the Court on the 7th day

(of January, 2005, which sets forth the findings and the reasons for the Order and is incorporated
herein.

DATED

t*£f

day of January, 2005.

j S ^ f ^ V i ^ p E COURT.
AV-

ON A HOGGAN. P C
ATTOflNCVS AT LAW
SB W t * T CCNTCT
f i > w » B2S
1AM. U T A * M J Z 3 O 0 2 B

<43S) 7*2 1551

< 2 3 CAST WAIN
P.O. B O * 1 XB
:MO**TON, UTAM 64337
«43t» Z B 7 - 3 M B

£oy

RULE 7f IM21 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuant to Rule 7(fX2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to this Order is
jsubraitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after service, the original will be filed with
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
m Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L Rev 150

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held
more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter,
the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences
on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a
successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of
Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L,
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involvmg the same legal issues decided by other

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
R2d 677 (Utah 1995).

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
14
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(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of N a t u r a l
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the U t a h Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any m a t t e r over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
ment by ch. 255, effective April 30, 2001, added
"parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h).
The 2001 amendment by ch. 302, effective
April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsection (2)(e) and made stylistic changes.
This section h a s been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.

History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, c h . 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, ^ 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, c h . 255,
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2001 amend-
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(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a
vacancy in t h a t office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme
Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by law.
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in
that office no more t h a n two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief
justice as consistent with law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986,
ch. 47, § 40; 1988, c h . 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80,
§ 4.
Cross-References. — Chief justice, U t a h
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
Disqualification in particular case, U t a h
Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
Judicial nomination and selection, Title 20A,
Chapter 12.

Membership on board of control of state law
library, § 9-7-301.
Proceedings unaffected by vacancy, § 78-721.
Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art.
VIII, Sec. 7.
Retirement, U t a h Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 15;
Title 49, Chapters 17 and 18; §§ 78-8-103,
78-8-104.
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 14.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Note, Death Qualification and the Right to an Impartial J u r y
Under the State Constitution: Capital J u r y
Selection in U t a h After State v. Young, 1995
Utah L. Rev. 365.

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6.

A m . Jur. 2d, — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 67,
68.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A
C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85.

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981,
ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state
law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to
final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees
ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, c h . 47, § 41; 1987, c h . 161, § 303; 1988,
c h . 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, $ 1; 1992, c h . 127,
§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5;
1995, ch. 299, § 46; 1996, ch. 159, § 18; 2001,
ch. 302, § 1.
R e p e a l s and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1986, ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as
enacted by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to
original appellate jurisdiction of Supreme
Court, and enacts the above section.

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, inserted "or
charge" in Subsection (3)(i) and made stylistic
changes.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Chief justice to preside over impeachment of governor, § 77-5-2.
Election contest appeals, §§ 20A-4-406,
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII,
Sec. 3; U.R.C.R 65B Utah R. App. R 19.
Jurisdiction, U t a h Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3.
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70A-2-101
Section
70A-2-715.
70A-2-716.
70A-2-717.
70A-2-718.
70A-2-719.
70A-2-720.

70A-2-721.
70A-2-722.
70A-2-723.
70A-2-724.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Buyer's incidental and consequential damages.
Buyer's right to specific performance or replevin.
Deduction of damages from the
price.
Liquidation or limitation of
damages — Deposits.
Contractual
modification
or
limitation of remedy.
Effect of "cancellation" or "rescission" on claims for antecedent breach.
Remedies for fraud.
Who can sue third parties for
injury to goods.
Proof of market price — Time
and place.
Admissibility of market quotations.

Section
70A-2-725.

Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.
Part 8

A s s i s t i v e Technology Warranty Act
70A-2-801.
70A-2-802.
70A-2-803.
70A-2-804.
70A-2-805.
70A-2-806.
70A-2-807.

Title.
Definitions.
Warranties.
Nonconforming assistive technology — Remedies.
Refunds — Computation — Prohibition of enforcement of
lease against consumer.
Resale or release of returned
assistive technology — Prohibition.
Consumer may not waive rights
under chapter — Enforcement — Remedies not exclu-

PARTI
SHORT TITLE, GENERAL CONSTRUCTION AND
SUBJECT MATTER
70A-2-101-

Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code
— Sales.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-101.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — The Uniform Commercial Code in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 904.

A.L.R. — Construction and effect of UCC
A r t 2, dealing with sales, 17 AX.R.3d 1010.

70A-2-102. Scope — Certain security and other transactions excluded from this chapter.
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions in
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a
security transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal any statute
regulating sales to consumers, fanners or other specified classes of buyers.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-102.
Cross-References. — Secured transactions,
Title 70A, Chapter 9a.
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thereto but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract
for the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject matter is to be
severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at
the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present
sale before severance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third-party rights
provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be
executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and shall
then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the contract
for sale.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-107; 1977,
ch. 272, § 3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Sand and gravel.
A contract to provide sand, gravel, and aggregate is a contract for the sale of goods, governed

by the UCC. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kasler
Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 77A C.J.S. Sales § 15.

PART 2
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF
CONTRACT
70A-2-201. Formal r e q u i r e m e n t s — S t a t u t e of frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate t h a t a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it h a s reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
Subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection CI) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate t h a t the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments
for their procurement: or
38
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(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits m his
pleading, testimor^ or otherwise in court t h a t a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted, or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606)
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, *} 2-201.
Cross-References. — Price payable in
money, goods, realty, or otherwise ^ 70A-2304

Statute of frauds generally, Title 25, Chapter
5

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Acceptance and receipt of goods
Admission of contract's existence
Application
"Between merchants" exception
Confirmatory memorandum
Contract for work
Definitions
Modification of contract
P a r t performance
Pleading statute
Proving nature of agreement
Purpose
Requirements
Stock transactions
Sufficiency of memorandum or writing
A c c e p t a n c e a n d receipt of g o o d s .
It is a question for jury to determine whether
or not defendant is to be deemed to have
accepted the goods by his failure to reject them
within a reasonable time Lauer v Richmond
Coop Mercantile I n s t , 8 U t a h 305, 31 P 397
(1892) (decided under former law)
Either words or conduct may be sufficient to
show acceptance of goods although the inference to be drawn from either should be clear
and unequivocal James Mack Co v Bear River
Milling Co , 63 Utah 565, 227 P 1033, 36 A L R
643 (1924) (decided under former law)
Manual and actual receipt of the goods is not
required, symbolic, constructive, or implied
possession is sufficient Hudson Furn Co v
Freed F u r n & Carpet Co , 10 U t a h 31,36 P 132
(1894) (decided under former law)

Court must examine the total posture of a
party s defense to determine whether the party
admitted the existence of a contract under this
section and, where party denied t h a t a contract
existed, whether his statements as to the price
and method of payment discussed and his use
of the term "contract price" amounted only to a
statement of negotiations for a contract
Rmderknecht v Luck, 965 P 2 d 564 (Utah Ct
App 1998)
Application.
Where buyer was m possession of wheat as
bailee and after oral contract for sale thereof
was entered into he requested extension of time
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of
s t a t u t e of frauds J a m e s Mack Co v Bear River
Milling Co , 63 U t a h 565, 227 P 1033, 36 A L R
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uniform Commercial Code)
Because amount involved in oral contract for
sale of turkey poults was in excess of $500, plea
of statute of frauds precluded its enforcement
Tanner v Childers, 108 U t a h 455, 160 P 2 d 965
(1945) (decided under former law).
"Between merchants" exception.
Since a farmer, party to a transaction with a
gram dealer, was not a "merchant" within the
meaning of this section, Subsection (2) did not
apply and the statute of frauds rendered unenforceable an oral agreement to sell the farmer's
whole wheat crop, valued substantially m excess of $500 Lish v Compton, 547 P 2 d 223
(Utah 1976)
Where buyer was m possession of wheat as
bailee and after oral contract for sale thereof
was entered into he requested extension of time
to pay for wheat, oral contract was taken out of
statute of frauds J a m e s Mack Co v Bear River
Milling Co , 63 Utah 565, 227 P 1033, 36 A L R
643 (1924) (decided prior to adoption of Uniform Commercial Code)

A d m i s s i o n of contract's e x i s t e n c e .
Admission by party to a transaction between
a merchant and a nonmerchant t h a t he would
have considered himself bound by their oral
agreement if he had received confirmation of it
within a reasonable time did not bring into
operation the provisions of Subsection (3 Kb)
and validate the otherwise unenforceable
agreement Lish v Compton, 547 P 2 d 223
(Utah 1976)

Confirmatory m e m o r a n d u m .
Where two elephant merchants agreed over
the telephone to the sale and purchase of t h e
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notwithstanding statute of frauds with respect
to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted, 97 A.L.R.3d 908.
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Construction of statute of frauds exception
under UCC § 2-201(2) for confirmatory writingbetween merchants, 82 A.L.R.4th 709.

70A-2-202. Final w r i t t e n expression — P a r o l or extrinsic
evidence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as
a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 70A-2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement
of the terms of the agreement.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-202.
Cross-References. — Exclusion or modification of warranties, § 70A-2-316.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Finality of written expression.
Sales tax payment.

complete and exclusive statement of the terms
pertaining to quantity and dimension. Durbano
Metals, Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., 574
p 2 d 1159 (Utah 1978).

Finality of w r i t t e n e x p r e s s i o n .
Where parties orally agreed to sale of certain
used railroad materials, purchaser sent seller
purchase order containing specifications for the
materials, seller signed the order, after inspecting the track purchaser sent new purchase
orders with different specifications, seller neither signed nor objected to the new orders, and
purchaser accepted materials not conforming to
any of the orders, the purchase orders were
clearly not intended by the parties to be a

Sales tax payment.
Prime contractor did not succeed in placing
burden of paying sales taxes on materialman
by showing trade usage or course of dealing
where record showed the parties were not engaged in the same trade or business and t h a t
the custom varied from trade to trade, and
where the evidence of a previous transaction by
the parties was not conclusive. Ralph Child
Constr. Co. v. United States, 365 F.2d 841 (10th
Cir. 1966).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young L a w Review. — Teaching
Paroi Evidence, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 647.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 74 to
79C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 910; 77A
C.J.S. Sales §§ 82 to 85.
A.L.R. — Application of parol evidence rule

of UCC § 2-202 where fraud or misrepresentation is claimed in sale of goods, 71 A.L.R.3d
1059.
Affirmations or representations made after
sale is closed as basis of warranty under UCC
§ 2-313(l)(a), 47 A.L.R.4th 200.

70A-2-203. Seals inoperative.
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for sale or an offer to
buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and the

41

T

I

70A-2-204

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

law wi tli respec t to s ealed ins t n iiii en ts does no t apply to si ich a con tract or
offer
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, eii. 154, ss 2-203.
REFERENCES
Am, J u r . 2d.
106.

70A-12-1204.

6'J A... J .:. Jil Sulcs ^

105,

Formation ui geiieial.

(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any mariner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract tor salt- •;;
>
.
• -1
even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indeiiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-204.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s , — Open terms, §§ 70A2-305 to 70A-2-311.
Supplementary general principles of law applicable, § 7 0 A - M 0 3 .

uconscionable contract or clause, § 70A-23012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANAI YSIS
ije lvery.
Failure for indeiiniteness.
u n
"
Delivery.
View that contract to be valid and enforceable had to have been delivered was a mistaken
view of the law since delivery is not necessary
in the absence of an express intention.
Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co.,
456 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1972).
F a i l u r e for i n d e f i n i t e n e s s .
„„
,,
. . ,
,
JI n
Where the original order s
Where the original order signed by the prospective buyer of an automobile was changed

by the dealer's sales manager and the buyer,
after failing to agree to a suggested financing
plan, gave the dealer a check on j/hich he wrote
t h a t t h e check w a s to be h e l ^ n t i l t h e b u y e r
secured a loan for the amount and then stopped
payment on the check the next day, the parties
failed to complete a contract since there was no
definite meeting of the minds. J. Golden Barton
Motor Co. v. Jackson, 9 Utah 2d 210, 341 P.2d
423 (1959) (decided under former law).
Not found.
Contract not formed under this section. See
Herm Hughes & Sons v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582
,TJ, , p , *
1999)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am J u r . 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 35.
C.J.S. — 77A C.J.S. Sales §§ 2, 9, 29 et seq,

70A-2-205

I' ii m offers.

An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
42
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7OA-2-207 • Additional t e r m s in acceptance or confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the
additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received,
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this act.
• History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-207.
Cross-References. — Acceptance of goods
by buyer, effect, § 70A-2-607.
Adequate assurance of performance, right to,
§ 70A-2-609.
Contractual modification or limitation of
remedy, § 70A-2-719.

Installment contracts, § 70A-2-612.
Liquidation or limitation of damages, § 70A2-718.
—'Transactions between merchants/' § 70A-2104.
/
Unconscionable contract or clause, § 70A-2302.

N O T F S T O DECISIONS
(2Kb) and thus did not become effective by
virtue of offeror's silence as to the added provision; seller could not recover attorney fees in
subsequent action on open account. Johnson
Tire Serv., Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521
(Utah 1980).

A-NAi/vsi:;

Attorney fees.
Cited.
Attorney fees.
Addition to the sales receipt (treated by parties as an "acceptance or a written confirmation") of a provision for attorney fees materially
altered the offer within meaning of Subsection

Cited in Herm Hughes & Sons v, Quintek,
834 R2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y L a w Review
— Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207
and the "Counter Offer"; Acceptance Unlimited?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 677.
A m . Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales $§ 153
to 174.

70A-2-208

COHI'NU

C.J.S. — 77A C.J.S. Sales §§ 2, 9.
A.L.R. — What are additional terms materially altering contract within meaning of UCC
$ 2-207(2Xb>, 72 A.L.R.3d 479.

of performance or practical construc-

tion.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the natiire of the nprfn rmance and oppor44

J

70A-2-607

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Risk of loss in absence of breach of contract,
§ 70A-2-509.

H i s t o r y : L. 1965, c h . 154, § 2-606.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Passing of title, reservation for security, § 70A-2-401.
Risk of loss, effect of breach of contract,
§ 70A-2-510.
NUTKH

DfcJ.'lSl'

ANALYSIS

Acceptance.
Sufficiency of acts of acceptance.
Sufficiency of findings of fact.
—Acts of acceptance.
Cited.
Acceptance.
Buyer of mobile home couid not recover for
breach of implied warranty of fitness after
living in mobile home for two years. Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Bums, 527 P.2d 655 (Utah
1974).
Sufficiency of a c t s of a c c e p t a n c e .
In action to recover purchase price of carload
of rice, which was sold by sample without
express warranty, where right of inspection
was intended as condition precedent to passing
of title, it was held that buyer did not accept
rice by removing it from car to make inspection.
Wall Rice Milling Co. v. Continental Supply Co.,
36 Utah 121, 103 P. 242, 140 Am. S t R. 815
(1909) (decided under prior law).
Where purchaser of stoves placed advertisement in newspapers offering stoves for sale and
naming dates upon which demonstrations
would be made, executed trade acceptance for

purchase price, and sent letter to seller that it
was attempting to settle for stoves and would
pay for them as soon as sold, his acts constituted acceptance within meaning of former
§ 60-3-8. Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. Farmers'
Cash Union, 61 Utah 567, 216 P. 1075 (1923).
Taking possession of goods is not determinative of acceptance, nor is signing a form acceptance before receipt of the goods, nor making of
lease payment. Colonial Pac. leasing Corp. v.
J.W.C.J.R. Corp., 1999 UT App fel, 977 P.2d
541.
Sufficiency of findings of fact
— A c t s of a c c e p t a n c e .
Where the trial judge failed to make findings
of fact on whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to inspect a computer and
software package, or whether it accepted the
goods, and where the facts were disputed, the
error was not harmless; reversal and remand
for further findings was necessary. Colonial
Pac. Leasing Corp. v. J.W.C. J.R. Corp., 1999 UT
App 91, 977 P.2d 541.
Cited in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Easier Corp.,
855 P. Supp. 1560 (D. Utah 1994) ^

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
!

Am. J u r . 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 623 et
seq.
77A C.J.S. Sales § 190 et seq.
C.J.S,

R. — Use of goods by buyer as constitut• reptance under UCC § 2-606(lXc), 67
A.L.R.3d 363.

70A -2-607. Effect of acceptance
Notice of b r e a c h
B u r d e n of establishing b r e a c h after acceptance
— Notice of claim or litigation to person answerable over,
(1) The buyer m u s t pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted.
(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods
accepted and if made with knowledge of a nonconformity cannot be revoked
because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the
nonconformity would be seasonably cured but acceptance does not of itself
impair any other remedy provided by this chapter for nonconformity.
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
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(a) the buyer m u s t within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from
any remedy; and
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (Subsection (3) of
Section 70A-2-312) and the buyer is sued as a result of such a breach he
m u s t so notify the seller within a reasonable time after he receives notice
of t h e litigation or be barred from any remedy over for liability established
by t h e litigation.
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the
goods accepted.
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for
which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice
states t h a t the seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does
not do so he will be bound in any action against him by Ins buyer by any
determination of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the seller
after seasonable receipt of t h e notice does come in and defend he is so
bound.
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (Subsection (3) of
Section 70A-2-312) the original seller may demand in writing t h a t his
buyer t u r n over to him control of the litigation including settlement or else
be barred from any remedy over and if he also agrees to bear all expense
and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then unless the buyer after seasonable receipt of the demand does t u r n over control the buyer is so barred.
(6) The provisions of Subsection (3), (4) and (5) apply to any obligation of a
buyer to hold the seller harmless against infringement or the like (Subsection
(3) of Section 70A-2-312).
History: L. 1965, c h . 154, § 2-607.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Deduction of damages from the price, § 70A-2-717.
Negotiable instruments, notice to third party,
§ 70A-3-119.

Notice and notification, § 70A-1-20K26).
Performance or acceptance under reservation
of rights, § 70A-1-207.
Reasonable time, § 70A-1-204.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Acceptance.
"Reasonabl^iniie."
Unreasonable^me.
Acceptance.
General engineering contractor's failure to
reject goods (aggregate for making concrete)
and its use of the aggregate on a construction
project resulted in an acceptance of the aggregate, barring contractor's breach of contract
claim for nonconforming goods. Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Kasler Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1560 (D.
Utah 1994).

was entered, but were persuaded by the seller
to keep the vehicle and take it on a planned trip
to California, during which time the already
noted problems persisted and new ones became
manifest so that the day after they returned
home purchasers again attempted rescission,
they acted within a "reasonable time" within
the meaning of this section. Christopher v.
Larson Ford Sales, Inc., 557 R2d 1009 (Utah
1976).
Unreasonable time.
Notification to seller t h a t it may have
breached warranties six years after tender of
delivery of concrete construction aggregates
and after buyer, general engineering contractor, should have discovered the breach was not,
as a matter of law, "within a reasonable time."
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kasler Corp., 855 F.
Supp. 1560 (D. Utah 1994).

"Reasonable t i m e . "
When purchasers of a motor home, upon
finding a number of defects in the vehicle,
sought to rescind the contract t h e day after it
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CUNTKA< T S AND OBLIGATIONS TN
GENERAL
Chapter
1. Interest.
2. Legal Capacity of Children.
3. Interparty Agreements.
4. Joint Obligations.
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed],
6. Prompt Payment Act.
7. Registered Public Obligations Act.
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act.
9 [ 'niform Athlete Agents Act.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section
15-1-1.

Interest rates — Contracted rate —
Legal rate.
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed.

lo-i i.

Section
15-1-3.
Calculated by the year.
15-1-4.
Interest on judgments.
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed.

i n t e r e s t r a t e s — C o n t r a c t e d r a t e •••- L e g a l r a t e .

(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action t h a t is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose
in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 1 4 1 981
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C X . 1907,
§ 1241; C X . J 917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1;
L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981,
ch. 73, § I; 1985, ch. 159, $ 6; 1989, c h . 79,
$ 1.
Cross-References. — Payment of interest

as extending statute of limitations, $ 78-12-44.
Rate where unspecified in instrument, § 70 A3-118.
Time from which interest runs, § 70A-3-112.
Utah Consumer Credit Code, ss 70C-1-101 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amount of award.
Damages for breach of contract.
Debts overdue.
Determination of damages.

Determining interest rate.
Eminent domain.
Federal court.
— Federal question.
Installments.

